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What is authority (precisely legal authority) and how does it work particularly within Islamic law? Authority can manifest itself whether in an individual Muslim person such as ulama, mufti, intellectual, or in institution. Authority can also rely on different types of written and unwritten materials to which Muslims refer. In addition, Hallaq argues, authority in Islamic law is at once religious and moral, but mostly epistemic in nature. More importantly, it has encompassed the power to set in motion the process of continuity and change.
It is on the basis on such views that legal authority in Islam has always dealt with the discussion of methodology in Islamic legal theory. At the same time, it invites some external power; let us say the state, to involve itself in and to set in motion the discourse on Islamic law. This is actually the precise condition which generated the production of Islamic legal knowledge.
This very nature of authority in Islamic law explains clearly the polemics and controversies that accompanied almost in every idea of reformism particularly in a sponsored Islamic legal reform. The transformation of fiqh to state law took place under the former Indonesia’s new order along with the controversies and public debate accompanied is only an example.
One aspect of ideas on Islamic legal reformism that evoked the most controversy was the notion of the possibility of the modification in the religious prescriptions which depart from what is in standing verses of the revelation. Furthermore, the arguments upon which Islamic legal reform based have been always considered unusual, new or even not really convincing. So, it is save to say that the polemics and controversies are methodological in character. It means debates, objections, and strident criticisms mere pursued on methodological issues.
The public face of the polemics on Islamic legal reform show us that there was a sort of open contestation of religious authorities in Islamic law. It was played out on two levels of meaning. First of all, it relied on the epistemological content of Islamic law; on how Qur’an is viewed and how a new situation in which textual sources have relevant no longer should be approached. The polemics and controversies were, indeed, contestations of the meaning of the textual basis of Islamic law.
This suggests once again that the authority of Islamic law lies in the divine reality as it was written in the revealed texts. The reason the polemics debated the methodologies that has been employed is perfectly understandable: only solid methodology can abstract law from its textual sources. In other words, the polemic reveals that there a shift in the idea of perceiving the textual basis of Islamic law. And, at a practical level, these contestations arose roughly and usually between independent ulamas and those who come to agree with the state ideas of state sponsored reform.
It is on the basis on such views that legal authority in Islam has always dealt with the discussion of methodology in Islamic legal theory. At the same time, it invites some external power; let us say the state, to involve itself in and to set in motion the discourse on Islamic law. This is actually the precise condition which generated the production of Islamic legal knowledge.
This very nature of authority in Islamic law explains clearly the polemics and controversies that accompanied almost in every idea of reformism particularly in a sponsored Islamic legal reform. The transformation of fiqh to state law took place under the former Indonesia’s new order along with the controversies and public debate accompanied is only an example.
One aspect of ideas on Islamic legal reformism that evoked the most controversy was the notion of the possibility of the modification in the religious prescriptions which depart from what is in standing verses of the revelation. Furthermore, the arguments upon which Islamic legal reform based have been always considered unusual, new or even not really convincing. So, it is save to say that the polemics and controversies are methodological in character. It means debates, objections, and strident criticisms mere pursued on methodological issues.
The public face of the polemics on Islamic legal reform show us that there was a sort of open contestation of religious authorities in Islamic law. It was played out on two levels of meaning. First of all, it relied on the epistemological content of Islamic law; on how Qur’an is viewed and how a new situation in which textual sources have relevant no longer should be approached. The polemics and controversies were, indeed, contestations of the meaning of the textual basis of Islamic law.
This suggests once again that the authority of Islamic law lies in the divine reality as it was written in the revealed texts. The reason the polemics debated the methodologies that has been employed is perfectly understandable: only solid methodology can abstract law from its textual sources. In other words, the polemic reveals that there a shift in the idea of perceiving the textual basis of Islamic law. And, at a practical level, these contestations arose roughly and usually between independent ulamas and those who come to agree with the state ideas of state sponsored reform.
